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Civil Code and Related Subject Matter
Robert A. Pascal*
Editorial Note: Many provisions of the Louisiana Civil
Code and of the Louisiana Revised Statutes were repealed
or amended in 1960 by legislation sponsored by the Louisiana
State Law Institute with the purpose of rendering the Civil
Code and the Revised Statutes consistent with the new Lou-
isiana Code of Civil Procedure. The amendments to Articles
2103 and 2315 of the Civil Code are discussed by Professor
Wex S. Malone at page 78 and following in this issue of
the Review. The intent and effect of the remainder of this
legislation affecting the Civil Code and related matter will
be discussed in an article to be published in a later issue of
the Review by Mr. Leon Sarpy, of the New Orleans Bar and
Professor of Civil Procedure at Loyola University in New
Orleans, and the Honorable Adrian G. Duplantier, Member
of the New Orleans Bar and State Senator from the Parish
of Orleans, who served as Reporter and as Research Assist-
ant, respectively, for the Louisiana State Law Institute on
many of these matters to which the legislation in question
relates. The following comments by Professor Pascal are re-
stricted, therefore, to legislation affecting the Civil Code and
related matters other than that sponsored by the Louisiana
State Law Institute in connection with the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure project.
CRIMINAL LEGISLATION ON MARRIAGE AND PROCREATION
The Crime of "Entering into Common Law Marriage"
Act 73 of 1960 adds a new article to the Criminal Code (R.S.
14:79.1) which makes "entering into a common law marriage"
a crime. To be guilty of the crime of entering into a common
law marriage a man and woman must agree "to then and there
become husband and wife, without a ceremonial marriage
solemnized . . . in accordance with the laws of this state . . .
followed by cohabitation." Inasmuch as marriage according to
the common law, or through the informal exchange of consent
without ceremony, has never been recognized in Louisiana, the
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
[53]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
instances of attempts to contract true marriage without formal
ceremony must be rare indeed. Nor must it be assumed that
the new legislation makes concubinage a crime. If that was the
intention of the draftsmen of the new article; it has not been
realized; for the statute makes criminal, not an agreement to
live together as if man and wife, but an "agreement ... to then
and there become husband and wife, without a ceremonial mar-
riage." To be guilty of the crime, therefore, the parties must
specifically intend to contract true marriage without following
the forms and solemnities prescribed by law. The many couples
living in concubinage in Louisiana most certainly do not consider
their unions true marriages. Indeed, they themselves, and com-
mon police and newspaper practice as well, indicate the differ-
ence between their unions and true marriages by referring to
them, though inappropriately, as "common law marriages." Thus
it would seem there should seldom be a proper occasion for
prosecution for the crime of "common law marriage" as defined
by the new legislation.
The Crime of "Conceiving and Giving Birth to Two or More
Illegitimate Children"
Act 75 of 1960 adds a new article to the Criminal Code
(R.S. 14:79.2) declaring "conceiving and giving birth to two
or more illegitimate children" to be a crime of which the father
and mother "shall be equally guilty" and which is punishable by
a fine of not more than one thousand dollars, or imprisonment
for not more than one year, or both. This new legislation, like
that on the crime of entering into a common law marriage, is
part of a legislative program ostensibly to reduce illegitimacy
in Louisiana. Although the writer, like almost everyone, is
against the conception of a child outside of marriage precisely
because it requires a sinful act on the part of its progenitors,
he cannot find words strong enough to condemn legislation such
as this. It is not reasonable to expect that its enactment will
have a noticeable effect in discouraging extra-marital inter-
course. Thus the number of illegitimate conceptions is not likely
to be reduced. On the other hand, it is reasonable to foresee
that, if the article is enforced, once conception has taken place
the parents may take steps to avoid prosecution. The best that
can be expected is that secret deliveries, often unattended or
attended by unskilled help under less than medically appropriate
conditions, will be attempted, much to the prejudice of the
[Vol. XXI
LEGISLATIVE SYMPOSIUM
mother and her child. More seriously, there can be little doubt
that the number of abortions will increase, not only to the
prejudice of the health of the mother, but to the denial of life
to the child itself. Under our law abortion is a crime, as it should
be. Morally it is perhaps even more heinous than murder, for it
deprives the unborn of all opportunity to live and to come to
know his place in God's creation. This new legislation, therefore,
because it will lead to the killing of the unborn, if it does not
suggest it, is inexcusable.
Very fortunately the new article is much more limited in
scope, if the ordinary canons for the interpretation of criminal
legislation are to be followed, than it was generally thought to
be at the time of its passage. Although the legislation probably
was believed to render criminal each and every conception of
an illegitimate child after the first, as written it makes it a
crime only to conceive and to give birth to twins, triplets, or
other multiples. It does not make criminal the conception and
birth of one child at a time. Admittedly this strips the new
article of any real force, and indeed may render the statute in-
valid as totally unreasonable, for as yet parents have not dis-
covered the means of controlling the number of children to be
born from any one act of conception; but the language of the
article as enacted can scarcely be interpreted in any other way.
Thus "Conceiving and giving birth to two or more illegitimate
children is. hereby declared to be a crime .... Each such birth
[i.e., of two or more illegitimate children] shall be a separate
violation ... ." Unless the principle nullum crimen sine lege is
to be ignored, it would seem that to give birth to one illegitimate




Act 411 of 1960 amended R.S. 40:209(c), which had been
added to the Revised Statutes by Act 579 of 1954. As originally
enacted in 1954 the legislation provided for the issuance of
letters by the registrars of birth in lieu of new birth registry
acts in instances of the adoption of children "of foreign birth."
The amendment changes this phrase to "born in a foreign
country." Thus whereas the legislation of 1954 applied to all
adopted children born outside Louisiana, whether in other states
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of the Union or in foreign countries, the amended legislation
applies only to those born in foreign countries. Reading the
entire section R.S. 40:209 as amended, it appears to the writer
that (1) new birth records are to be made for adopted children
born in Louisiana (subsections A and B) and that (2) a letter
in lieu of birth certificate is to issue for adopted children born in
a foreign country, but that (3) neither is a new record to be
made nor is any letter in lieu thereof to issue for an adopted
child born elsewhere than in Louisiana or a foreign country.
R.S. 40:332 and 40:335 as amended by Act 410 of 1960 re-
quires that the City of New Orleans Board of Health be made a
party to suits for the issuance of delayed birth records filed in
that parish, that such Board be served with a copy of each such
petition, that a copy of each such petition filed outside Orleans
Parish be served on the State Board of Health, and that certified
copies of such birth records shall be furnished by the City of
New Orleans Board of Health in New Orleans and by the State
Board of Health if the record is outside Orleans Parish. Under
the former law the clerks of court of the various parishes were
obliged to furnish such copies.
Adoption
Under R.S. 9:422.1, added by Act 501 of 1958, if the spouse
of one petitioning for the adoption of a child was its legitimate
parent, then the consent of the other legitimate parent was not
necessary (a) if the spouse of the petitioner had been awarded
custody of the child and (b) if the other parent had refused or
failed to comply for three years with an order for support of the
child. Act 268 of 1960 amends this section in two respects, (1)
by reducing the period of refusal or failure to comply with a
support order from three years to one year, and (2) by extend-
ing the rule on the non-necessity of parental consent to adoption
to include the case of an adoption by a grandparent given custody
of the child. It is to be noted that the amendment did not correct,
but re-enacted, a most objectionable feature of the original pro-
vision, that of permitting adoption without consent of the parent
not given custody if he or she failed to comply with an order to
support the child without reference to the reason for his failure
to do so.'
1. See the writer's comments on R.S. 9:422.1 as enacted by La. Acts 1958,
No. 501, in 19 LOUISIANA LAW REviEw 59-60 (1958).
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A number of sections of the Revised Statutes dealing with
the adoption of persons under seventeen were amended. Act 250
of 1960 amended R.S. 9:432 and 440; Act 268 of 1960 amended
R.S. 9:429, 431, 432, and 440. Thus two amendments of R.S.
9:432 and 440 were adopted. Presumably the act signed last, No.
268, will prevail over that signed first, 250, where their pro-
visions are inconsistent. The amendments to R.S. 9:429 and 432
by Act 268 of 1960 do not deny to the natural parent the right
to withdraw his or her consent to the adoption after the inter-
locutory decree has been made but do provide that such with-
drawal of consent shall not be a bar to the final decree of adop-
tion. These amendments do not, however, deprive the court of
the power to deny the final decree of adoption if this would seem
to be in the best interest of the child. R.S. 9:432 as enacted orig-
inally and as amended both by Act 250 and by Act 268 of 1960
allows the court to deny the final decree in the best interest of
the child; and although Act 268 of 1960 amended R.S. 9:431 to
provide that the "mere" withdrawal of parental consent shall
not be a reason for revoking the interlocutory decree, it would
seem that if the judge believes that it would be in the best inter-
est of the child to revoke that decree and return the child to its
parents he may do so. Consistent with these new provisions Act
268 of 1960 amended R.S. 9:432 to provide that the petition for
final adoption shall not be served on anyone except the Depart-
ment of Public Welfare. Act 250 of 1960 amended R.S. 9:432
only to provide that the petition for final decree should not be
served on the parents of the child. Inasmuch as the amendment
worked by Act 268 is not only that signed last but also the broad-
er of the two amendments, it would seem to be the fuller expres-
sion of the law.
Finally, R.S. 9:440 was amended by both Act 250 and Act
268 of 1960 to provide peremption periods for attacking final
decrees of adoption rendered before July 15, 1960. The first
establishes a period of six months from the effective date of the
act (July 27, 1960) for all bases of attack; the second establishes
a period of six months from July 15, 1960, for attacks based on
lack of jurisdiction ratione personae, procedural defect, or in-
validity of the statute under which the decree was made. Inas-
much as the basis of peremption under Act 250 of 1960 is nar-
rower than that stated in Act 250, and inasmuch as its period is
shorter than that given in Act 268, without it being clear that
1960]
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Act 250 is superseded completely by Act 268, it is conceivable
that a difficult problem of interpretation might arise.
Servitudes
Act 448 of 1960 amended R.S. 9:5622, which provides a two-
year prescriptive period against actions to enjoin or obtain dam-
ages for violation of building restrictions, to provide a mode for
terminating building restrictions established "in pursuance of a
general subdivision plan devised by a common ancestor in title."
Now such restrictions may be terminated by the agreement of
"the owners of a majority of the square footage of land in said
subdivision" to take effect on a date specified, but not less than
fifteen years from the establishment of the restrictions, and re-
corded in the conveyance and mortgage records. It is expressly
provided that such agreements may not terminate or modify sub-
division plans for utilities services. It may be noted that to in-
troduce this legislation as an amendment to a provision on pre-
scription was quite inappropriate. It would have been better to
insert it under the title on servitudes.
Successions
Act 497 of 1960 amends R.S. 9:1581-89 on public administra-
tors for successions and also adds a new section R.S. 9:1590. In
general the new legislation is similar to the old but (1) it applies
to all parishes with populations of more than one hundred thou-
sand inhabitants, other than Caddo, Ouachita, and Calcasieu,
rather than to Orleans Parish only; (2) authorizes the governor
to fix the administrator's bond at a figure between ten and fifty
thousand dollars at his discretion; (3) requires advertising of
the administrator's application for appointment to administer
particular successions; and (4) by omission repeals R.S. 9:1587
relative to deposits in banks belonging to persons who have not
been heard from for ten years or more.
Act 464 of 1960 replaces R.S. 6:789.1, added by Act 328 of
1958, with R.S. 6:789.1-789.3, which prescribe in greater detail
the procedure according to which building and loan associations
may pay to executors and administrators the value of shares or
other credits belonging to the decedent.
Act 362 of 1960 adds R.S. 9:2431-2438 detailing the manner
in which (1) the federal estate tax and (2) the Louisiana estate
transfer tax shall be apportioned among the persons interested in
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the estate in the absence of apportionment by the testator him-
self.
Immovables Donated To Religious Entities
By Act 462 of 1952, R.S. 9:2321 and 2322 were added to our
legislation to permit immovables donated to religious entities for
religious purposes to be disposed of in full ownership or in any
way encumbered after possession and use for the purpose intend-
ed by the donor for sixty years. Act 226 of 1960 amends R.S.
9:2321 and 2322 to reduce the period to thirty years and to
clarify their language. In effect the act limits to thirty years
the period for which conditions might be imposed in donations
of immovables to religious entities. Because the act discrimi-
nates between religious and non-religious donees it may be open
to the objection that it violates the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment.
Private Express Trusts
R.S. 9:1873 has been amended by Act 96 of 1960 to permit
employers to be trustees of trusts established by them for the
benefit of their employees.
R.S. 9:2063, which detailed the law on "joint investment
funds," has been amended by Act 378 of 1960. The amended sec-
tion uses the term "common trust fund" in place of "joint invest-
ment fund," but is substantively similar to the original section
except in the following particulars:
(1) It is expressly provided that a common trust fund may
be established by one of several co-trustees and investments
made therein with the consent of the other co-trustees;
(2) Investments of a common trust fund are no longer lim-
ited to the legal list, though a trustee restricted to legal list in-
vestments may invest only in common trust funds invested ac-
cording to the legal list;
(3) The value of cash or marketable investments required
before additions to a common fund are permissible has been re-
duced from sixty to forty percent of that of the whole fund.
Majority Rule of "Local Beneficiaries" for Certain "Trusts for
Educational, Charitable or Religious Purposes"
Under Act 346 of 1960, adding Sections 9:2281 and 2282 to
the Revised Statutes, whenever the "local beneficiaries" of any
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"express or implied trust for educational, charitable or religious
purposes," or their predecessors, have contributed a "substantial
part" of the "trust" property, and two-thirds of the adult local
beneficiaries residing in Louisiana "determine that there exists
a deep-seated and irreconcilable hostility or tension between them
and any or all of the trustees or others in authority exercising
control over the administration of such Trust," the local benefi-
ciaries may petition for the discharge of the then trustees and
the appointment of others. The act expressly excludes "Roman
Catholic educational, charitable, and religious trusts" from its
operation, and hence, if otherwise valid, would seem to violate
the fourteenth amendment by denying equal protection of the
laws to certain groups on the basis of religion. Beyond this, how-
ever, the effective scope and validity of the legislation would
seem extremely questionable. The act purports to regulate "ex-
press or implied trusts for educational, charitable or religious
purposes." Actually this is the first juridical recognition of "im-
plied" trusts of that character, and it is only an oblique one.
Furthermore, the language of the act is too specifically that of
trusts to permit its application to educational, charitable, and
religious institutions established on a non-trust basis. Thus it
can hardly be said that the act can apply to any but express
trusts for the purposes mentioned.
Viewed as legislation permitting the recipients of the benefit
of a trust for educational, charitable, or religious purposes to
demand a change in the trustees the act is strange indeed, for
traditionally an educational, charitable, or religious trust is
established for a purpose specified by the will of the settlor and
administered by trustees either appointed by the settlors, or pur-
suant to a procedure specified by the settlors, or by the Govern-
or. Never before have persons availing themselves of the bene-
fit of the trust, whether they have contributed materially to it
or not, been permitted to demand the discharge of the trustees
and the appointment of others. Indeed, it seems that to apply
the act to trusts for educational, charitable, or religious purposes
settled before the effective date of the 1960 legislation might be
considered an interference with the essentially contractual obli-
gations accepted by the trustees on the establishment of the trust.
Conventional Obligations
Act 84 of 1960 amends R.S. 9:2771, enacted by Act 183 of
1958, to limit further the liability of contractors on works con-
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structed according to plans furnished by others. The amend-
ment specifically excludes liability for destruction, deterioration,
or defects pending construction as well as after its completion
and also provides that the provisions of the section shall not be
waivable by the contractor.
Act 460 of 1960 amends R.S. 9:2961 declaring bulk sales void
as against creditors of the transferor unless made in conformity
with the Bulk Sales Law. The amendment limits application of
the act to bulk sales affecting credits against the transferor
existing as of the time of the transfer. Under the amendment,
therefore, one may not avail himself of the provisions of the Bulk
Sales Law in order to protect a credit arising after the irregular
bulk sale.
Act 490 of 1960 adds R.S. 9:3601 to require persons "engaged
in the newspaper business" to pay interest to its distributors or
dealers on deposits as security for the price of newspapers fur-
nished them.
The Uniform Fiduciaries Law was enacted by Act 226 of
1924 and is presently designated R.S. 9:3801-3814. Act 444 of
1960 repeals the one section of that law dealing with the transfer
of stocks, bonds, and other securities (R.S. 9:3803) and replaces
it with the Uniform Law for simplification of fiduciary security
transfers. The new act has been designated R.S. 9:3831-3840.
The new Uniform Act is one recently prepared by the National
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and between January and
November of 1959 it had been adopted by eleven states.2 Pre-
sumably more have adopted it since then. Under the repealed
R.S. 9:3803 corporations and transfer agents were liable for a
wrongful transfer of securities by a fiduciary only if they had
actual knowledge of the irregularity or knowledge of such facts
as would put them in bad faith. Under this legislation corpora-
tions and transfer agents continued to demand proof of authority
to sell and hence security transfers by fiduciaries continued to
be difficult. The principal purpose of the new act is to so relieve
corporations and their agents of responsibility that they should
no longer feel the need to demand proof of authority to sell.
Under its provisions corporations and transfer agents are liable
only where they have received notice in writing of the lack of
authority or of an adverse claim of interest. The same exonera-
2. 90 ULA 43 (1959 Pocket Part).
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tion of liability is made to apply to third persons involved in the
transfer of securities by fiduciaries.8
Expropriation
Articles 2634 and 2636 of the Civil Code have been amended
by Act 92 of 1960 to strengthen the statement in the first sen-
tence of Article 2634, forbidding suspensive appeals in expro-
priation cases. The new amendment clearly precludes suspensive
appeals from any facet of an expropriation proceeding.
Security Devices
Under R.S. 32:706 and 710, portions of the Vehicle Certifi-
cate of Title Law, as they stood before amendment in 1960, chat-
tel mortgages were effective against third persons only from the
date of notation thereof by the commissioner of vehicle registra-
tion on the document of title, or, in the case of floor plan mort-
gages, in the register of such mortgages. Amendments to the
above mentioned sections by Act 265 of 1960 render the mort-
gages effective against third persons (1) from the date of execu-
tion if notation is made by the commissioner in the proper place
within fifteen days from that date or (2) from the date of such
notation if the notation is made more than fifteen days from the
date of execution. "Period of grace" registration provisions like
that provided for in the amendment may make it unnecessary for
a mortgagee to race to the registry office for his protection, but
they also of necessity introduce a delay equivalent to the period
of grace into all transactions as to the property in question. As
a result of this legislation it would not be unreasonable for a
lender or purchaser to insist on paying only after the period of
grace (here 15 days) had run so that he might be certain that
an as yet unrecorded mortgage to another might not prime that
given to him or encumber his title. This new legislation there-
fore should at least be amended to reduce the period of grace to
a shorter term.
The law on privileges for labor and materials furnished in
connection with "private works" was amended in several re-
spects. Act 60 of 1960 amended R.S. 9:4801 apparently only for
clarification of language and Act 111 of 1960 amended R.S.
3. See the comment on the Uniform Act for the Simplification of Fiduciary
Security Transfers in 90 ULA 43-47 (1959 Pocket Part).
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9:4803, 4806, and 4814 to provide special conditions for the en-
forcement of claims by a creditor of a sub-contractor against the
contractor or his surety. Act 456 of 1960 adds a subsection (b)
to R.S. 9:4816 under which an affidavit by the owner and con-
tractor as to the date of the completion and acceptance of work
done shall be considered conclusive evidence of the same when
filed in the mortgage records. Act 366 of 1960 made an addition
to R.S. 9:4817 under which it is expressly stipulated that the
manner and method of creating and preserving the privilege for
labor and materials furnished for private works shall not be
altered by the furnishing of promissory notes, a provision for
time payments, "or any other similar stipulation."
R.S. 9:4841, originally enacted as Act 246 of 1926, authorizes
contractors to bond claims made against them for labor or ma-
terials furnished in connection with a private work. Now Act
359 of 1960 has added R.S. 9:4842 under which owners of im-
movables are specifically recognized as having a similar right to
bond all claims "filed or recorded against . . . work" on their
property. Neither the older R.S. 9:4841 nor the similarly worded
new R.S. 9:4842 provide in any way for the cancellation of privi-
leges recorded against the property or the recordation of the
bond and hence it may be asked whether these sections give
either the contractor or the property owner a right which he
would not have had without their enactment. One may, after all,
always enter into a surety contract.
Act 217 of 1960, which has been designated R.S. 9:4961,
limits to five hundred dollars the amount which may be recov-
ered in reimbursement of an attorney's fee to enforce a privilege
for work or materials furnished when the attorney's services
have been limited to the recordation of the privilege.
Prescription
Several statutes pertaining to prescription in civil matters
were passed. Acts 367 and 407 of 1960 contain provisions which
are overlapping and somewhat inconsistent with each other. Act
407 amends Article 3543 of the Civil Code, which specifies the
general period of liberative prescription applicable to claims
based on informalities of legal procedure in sales pursuant to
order of court, to include specifically private sales as well as
sales by public auction. The period of prescription according to
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Articles 3543 is two years, except where the interests of minors
or interdicts are involved, in which cases it is stated to be five
years. Act 367, enacted as an addition to the Revised Statutes
with the designation R.S. 9:1454.1, specifies a two-year prescrip-
tive period against claims based on informalities of legal pro-
cedure in court-ordered private sales of succession property only
and does not specify a different period where the interests of
minors and interdicts are involved. On the basis that R.S.
9:1454.1 as amended applies only to sales of succession property
it is arguable that it establishes a special prescriptive period for
such sales only, and that the more general rule of Article 3543 as
amended by Act 407 is applicable to sales other than of succes-
sion property. On the other hand it may be argued that Act 407,
amending Article 3543, was intended to apply to all sales pur-
suant to order of court and, being the later expression of the law,
should be deemed to supersede the new section R.S. 9:1454.1 of
limited scope.
Act 584 introduced new sections R.S. 9:5682-5684 to provide
a new prescription against claims by unrecognized heirs or lega-
tees against third persons in possession of "property" acquired
from or through one recognized as an heir or legatee of the de-
ceased. Under the legislation the action may not be brought if
the third person (i.e., one not himself an heir or legatee) "or his
ancestors in title" have been in continuous, uninterrupted, peace-
able, public, and unequivocal possession for ten years after the
registry of the judgment of possession in the conveyance records
of the parish where the property is situated. The new prescrip-
tion is not available to persons recognized as heirs or legatees in
the succession proceedings. The act evidently was intended to
relate to immovable property only, but does not say so specific-
ally. Inasmuch as a period of possession is required, the pre-
scription is acquisitive rather than liberative in nature. It may
be noted that nothing in the legislation indicates that the posses-
sion of the third person must be in good faith, but it would seem
that unless the legislation is interpreted to require good faith
acquisition by third party possessors claiming prescription the
door to fraud will be open, especially if the possession of the
heir or legatee ancestor in title can be counted; and on this latter
score the language of the legislation is quite ambiguous.
R.S. 9:5806, on the imprescriptibility of mineral rights re-
served by private persons in transfers to governmental agencies,
[Vol. XXI
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has been amended by Act 528 of 1960 to include reservations in
transfers to "any political subdivision authorized to incur debt
and issue bonds under the provisions of the Constitution and
statutes of the state of Louisiana" among those covered by this
section.
